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28 December 1963

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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STATE review(s) completed.

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Berlin: The head of the West German interzonal trade office in Berlin, Leopold, expects that the Christmas pass agreement with East Germany will result in more frequent high-level contacts between East and West Germany

Leopold notes that the East Germans are already trying to remove one trade issue from the jurisdiction of his office and have it negotiated directly by East and West German ministries. He expects that very soon the GDR will insist that questions of trade with West Berlin be handled directly with the Senat. This line of development, in Leopold's opinion, might be arrested if Bonn and the Senat resisted stoutly, but he doubts that they will

The US Mission in Berlin points out that Governing Mayor Brandt and his associates believe that to ameliorate hardships in East Germany and achieve progress toward unification, a modus vivendi must be achieved with the Soviets and with the East German regime. These leaders believe that German policy should therefore be to extend financial assistance to East Germany and to develop new channels of contact with the East German regime. An adviser of Brandt's has remarked that the visiting system operating for the Christmas season would be acceptable on a permanent basis

While the attitude of Chancellor Erhard's government is not fully clear, it seems receptive to Brandt's approach and it appears much more willing than Adenauer's to experiment in relations with the East.

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South Vietnam: The contents of a large Viet Cong supply depot captured this week by government troops provide further evidence that external support is contributing to the improved firepower of the Communist guerrillas.

Ammunition seized in the depot amounted to more than 290,000 rounds. It was mostly of Chinese Communist manufacture and included some 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifle rounds. In addition to locally manufactured mines, grenades, and rifles, and some US equipment, government troops found two Chinese-type carbines, a 90-mm. rocket launcher of Chinese Communist make, and two new, apparently Chinese, 60-mm. mortars still in preservative compound.

While the Viet Cong continue to obtain the bulk of their equipment by capture from government troops, increasing quantities of bloc-made equipment have been found in Viet Cong hands during the past year.

Although this is one of the largest Viet Cong dumps encountered, it is not clear what over-all effect its capture will have on the Communists' logistic situation. In recent months, the Viet Cong had made significant gains in the area south of Saigon, where the dump was located.

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Kenya-Somalia: The dispute between Kenya and Somalia over control of Kenya's Northeastern Region seems likely to sharpen.

Somali terrorists have been particularly active since Kenya became independent of Britain on 12 December. The Kenya Government's action this week in declaring a state of emergency indicates that it believes it must react decisively to the activities of the Somali inhabitants and cross-border raiders.

Kenyatta has reportedly said that Kenyan forces will not resort to "hot pursuit" across the Somali border, since this would permit the Somalis to internationalize the situation, perhaps by an appeal to the UN. The USEmbassy is skeptical, however, that the Kenyan authorities can control the situation simply by patrolling the five-mile-deep "dead zone" they have proclaimed along the 450-mile border.

One immediate effect of the Kenyan move is likely to be to bring the Somali Government under pressure to give more support to the guerrillas.

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December Mogadiscio had already given the guerrillas some 500 carbines and 7,000 rounds of ammunition. Continued support, even on this relatively small scale, could result in a prolonged guerrilla war and a severe economic drain on Kenya.


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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board, on 27 December 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 11-10-63: "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare"

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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